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THE IDEALISTIC REACTION AGAINST SCIENCE. Professor ALIOTTA, Royal University of Padua. Translated by Agnes McCaskill. Macmillan & Co. 1914. Pp. xxii, 483. \$3.00.

The author tells us that "this work must be regarded as a new edition rather than a mere translation" of his book, *La Reazione idealistica contro la scienza*, published in Italy in 1912, since he has "subjected the whole of it to a process of revision with a view to improving it and adapting it to the British public." A more descriptive title for the book would be "The Reaction against Intellectualism." Even this title suggests a scope narrower than that which the book really has. It is in fact a critical summary of present tendencies in philosophy and in science, with special reference to the attacks upon the traditional intellectualism. These attacks have emanated from a variety of sources, and give to the thought of the present a general and distinctive character. It is not against the ideal of exact science merely that this movement is directed, but against philosophical rationalism as well; and idealism is by no means the only, or even the chief factor in this movement. The author defines intellectualism as follows: "By the term 'intellectualism,' taken in the widest sense of the word, we shall understand those epistemological systems which assign an autonomous value to the cognitive function." The reaction to intellectualism comprises all those views which would "make the value of science and of knowledge in general depend upon the ends of other functions of the mind, and rank will and imagination above intellect." As to the author himself, he exemplifies a reaction against this reaction. So far as this leading issue is concerned, he sides with intellectualism, and is therefore opposed to what he regards as the "predominant characteristic" of contemporary philosophy.

Anti-intellectualism first becomes a conscious motive among the pragmatists and Bergsonians. The fundamental error which Bergson commits is his attempt to derive intelligence from something else, such as æsthetic or practical activity. The world of the intellect, says Professor Aliotta, is an anomaly either from the standpoint of æstheticism or from that of moralism. The only way to account for it is to regard it as original and irreducible. But it is more than that; it is the indispensable ground of any world. Pragmatism, as exemplified by James and Dewey, does not, according to our author, succeed in getting away from those appeals to fact and to the principle of contradiction which have always been distinctive

of the cognitive as opposed to the practical faculties. The voluntaristic idealists, or "absolute pragmatists," as Professor Royce proposes to call them, are discussed in the present book under the somewhat misleading title, "The Philosophy of Values and the Historic Method." The essential contention of this group of thinkers is that such practical categories as "ought" or "ideal," are prior to the category of existence owing to the normative or purposive character of the act of judgment. Professor Aliotta argues both for the possibility of knowing existence without the act of judgment, and for a realistic interpretation of judgment itself. The philosophy of Royce, in which "the reaction from intellectualism reaches its speculative acme," is evidently greatly admired by the author; but he rejects it, not only on account of its voluntarism but on account of its pantheistic inclusion of the finite consciousness within the Divine Mind.

So far the author has dealt with those assaults upon the intellect that have emanated from philosophical sources. In Part II he deals with similar tendencies in science; in particular with the disposition among scientists to regard the logical and mathematical apparatus with which they work as conventional and arbitrary. It is not mere utility that dictates the formal factor in science, so our author contends, but the independent and incontrovertible motive of rationality. Science, in so far as it brings facts under laws and systems, partially achieves that which philosophy carries to completion — the discovery, namely, of that rational order which is "the necessary postulate of all knowledge." Nevertheless Professor Aliotta dissents from the "logical realists," like Mr. Russell, who would give a thoroughly objective status to the truths of the intellect. He very properly contends that a logical realism implies the "external" theory of relations, according to which relations are distinct and separable entities capable of doing their own relating. But this view lacks, he thinks, that "synthetic principle," "that organic unity of thought and reality which alone can render knowledge intelligible." In short, Professor Aliotta belongs to that numerous group of thinkers who regard the unity of the conscious self as more "intelligible" than the unity composed by two terms and a relation; and who propose, therefore, to explain all order and connection in the world by attributing it to "thought."

In this fundamental respect the author is unmistakably an idealist. But he terms his philosophy "a form of spiritualistic realism," because of his insistence upon the independence both of nature on the mind of man, and of the human mind on that of God. This

resembles the view which has been known in England and America as "Personal Idealism," and is represented by Howison, Sturt, and others. It also has important points of resemblance to the pluralism of Leibniz, and to the more recent pluralism of James Ward. All of these philosophies would agree with Professor Aliotta's fundamental contention that "we have immediate assurance of our subjective life, an assurance which cannot be shaken by sceptical doubt." All would agree that this individual and internal subjectivity must ever remain external to any other subject, and so be incapable of being absorbed in any one absolute mind.

The most prominent note in the present book is its insistence upon the priority of thought over will. When we know, says our author, "the mind recognizes objects and relations whose existence does not depend at all upon its volition." He also concedes that in all knowledge there is an acknowledgment of the objects' independence. He hastens to add that this does not imply their independence of all consciousness but only of the individual consciousness. So our author attempts that compromise between realism and subjectivism which is characteristic of those who style themselves "objective idealists." But he attempts it in a novel manner. Instead of supposing that in knowledge the mind divests itself of its individuality, and unites itself with an absolute mind which creates and constitutes its object, he supposes that the mind recognizes as objective and independent a certain set of laws and categories which are the *end* or *goal* of nature. The mind is justified in imposing its own necessities of thought upon nature, because these necessities, and the mind which recognizes them, are the "end towards which the becoming of things tends." To a logical realist all of this elaborate speculation is gratuitous. The mind does not first give expression to certain ideals of rationality that spring from within, and then, discovering the miracle that nature also respects these ideals, solemnly conclude that there must be some complicity on the part of nature. The logical realist finds the laws and categories in nature to start with; and since they never belonged to the mind, the fact that nature obeys them does not prove any determination of nature by mind.

This book has many merits. Its style is exceptionally good, and the thought is clear. The author's own view is not wholly convincing, and does not always strike the reader as rigorous in its reasoning. It is eclectic rather than radical and clean cut. But as an exposition of the variety of contemporary philosophies it is of distinguished excellence. There is no other book on present

tendencies so cosmopolitan in its scope and so scrupulously fair in its representation of conflicting views.

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HENRI BERGSON: A STUDY IN RADICAL EVOLUTION. EMIL CARL WILM, Ph.D., LL.D. Sturgis & Walton Co., New York. 1914. Pp. xviii, 193.

Of its kind this is an excellent little book. Professor Wilm has successfully achieved, I should say, the task which he has set himself, viz., to give "a brief and comparatively non-technical statement of Bergson's philosophy which shall be intelligible to the general reader who wishes to know something of this much-talked-of philosopher" (Preface, p. xi). It is always hard for a professor to write, and for another professor to judge, a book intended for a non-professorial audience; but among popular expositions of Bergson I should rank this book by the side of Dr. Wildon Carr's well-known little volume. Where Dr. Carr, however, writes with the enthusiastic zeal of a prophet, Professor Wilm writes with a calm detachment which makes for perspective and critical balance. He has a deft touch in exposition, and the happy knack of apposite quotation both from philosophy and poetry. Nothing could be more felicitous than the illustration of Bergson's intuition from Browning's *Paracelsus* (p. 80).

The book consists of an introductory section, followed by twelve expository and four critical sections. The expository sections deal with such topics as Change and Duration, Bergson's criticism of the Intellect at work in the conceptual analyses of Psychology and Physics, Intuition as the true method of Metaphysics, Evolution and Creation, Mechanism and Design, Freedom. That hardly any use should have been made of Bergson's most technical work, *Matière et Mémoire*, is due, no doubt, to the non-technical aim of the book. Otherwise the exposition is, within its self-imposed limits, accurate. There is only one point on which I am tempted to dissent strongly from Professor Wilm's interpretation. It appears to me that he altogether overshoots the mark when, in discussing Bergson's account of intuition as intellectual sympathy, as a viewing of the object "from within" instead of "from without," he suggests that Bergson's position is "distinctly reminiscent" of that of Leibniz's Monadology (p. 72). The pluralism of discrete, self-contained monads is as foreign, I should say, to the monism of Bergson's *élan vital*, as the suggestion that Bergson's intuition reflects the inner life of objects in the same way in which each Leibnizian monad